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This study investigates the anomalous findings of the previous insider trading studies that any 
investor can earn abnormal profits by reading the Ofi&/ Summan/. Availability of abnormal 
profits to insiders, availability of abnormal profits to outsiders who imitate insiders. determinants 
of insiders’ predictive ability, and effect of insider trading on costs of trading for other investors 
are examined by using approximately 60,000 insider sale and purchase transactions from 1975 to 
1981. Implications for market efficiency and evaluation of abnormal profits to active trading 
strategies are discussed. 
I. Introduction 
Numerous studies, such as Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) Pratt and DeVere 
(1970) Jaffe (1974), and Finnerty (1976) among others, conclude that insiders 
earn significant abnormal profits by trading the securities of their own firms.’ 
Estimates of insiders’ abnormal profits in these studies vary from 3% to 30% 
during holding periods of eight months to three years. Surprisingly, insider 
trading studies also report that even uninformed outsiders can earn significant 
abnormal profits by imitating insiders: Outsiders can purchase stock following 
insiders’ stock purchases, sell stock following insiders’ stock sales using pub- 
licly available insider trading information, and thereby also earn 3% to 30% 
abnormal profits. 
The conclusion that abnormal profits can be earned by trading on the basis 
of publicly available information contradicts the efficient markets hypothesis 
which maintains that security prices respond rapidly to public information, 
*This paper is based on a Ph.D. dissertation written at the University of Rochester, I am 
grateful to my dissertation committee, G. William Schwert (chairman), Clifford W. Smith, and 
Jerold B. Warner for their guidance and encouragement. Helpful comments were received from 
Michael Bradley, Susan Chaplinsky, Eugene Fama, Michael Jensen, Han Kim, Richard Leftwich, 
Wayne Mikkelson, Jay Ritter, and an anonymous referee. 
‘Individuals who are officers, directors, and owners of 10% or more of any equity class of 
securities are defined as insiders by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
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thus precluding any systematic profit opportunities. The efficient markets 
hypothesis is a central tenet of financial economics and it is supported by a 
large body of evidence.* This study reinvestigates stock price behavior follow- 
ing insiders’ transactions and attempts to reconcile the efficient markets 
hypothesis with the previously reported availability of abnormal profits to 
outsiders. 
Recent studies by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) document that the use 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model results in potential biases in measuring 
expected returns to securities. Consequently, the results of the previous insider 
trading studies using the CAPM must be interpreted with caution. The 
methodology used in this study avoids this bias. Furthermore, previous insider 
trading studies generally assume that all insider trading information becomes 
publicly available within two months. This assumption can lead to a potential 
bias against market efficiency: In efficient markets, stock price reaction is 
expected to occur at the time information becomes public. If some transactions 
are published with a more than two month delay, then the stock price reaction 
is also expected to occur with a more than two month delay. To evaluate the 
abnormal returns available to outsiders, this study uses the actual dates 
insiders first report their transactions to the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion (SEC) and the dates insider trading information is published in the 
Oficial Summary. The profitability of insider trading is evaluated by examin- 
ing approximately 60,000 insider transactions during the period 1975 to 1981. 
The data are analyzed separately for buy and sell decisions, type of insiders, 
and dollar volume of insider trading. 
A generally overlooked implication of profitable trading by informed inves- 
tors is that there is a loser for each winner, since informed traders’ abnormal 
profits reduce the opposing traders’ realized returns dollar for dollar. An 
investor who attempts to exploit a perceived profit opportunity must also bear 
the risk of potential losses to opposing informed traders. If the informed 
traders impose significant losses on the opposing uninformed traders, then 
ignoring informed traders’ abnormal profits can lead to an overstatement of 
the realizable abnormal returns to any trading rule. 
The significance of the costs imposed by the informed traders on the 
uninformed traders has not been empirically examined, since the informed 
traders’ abnormal profits are not readily observable. Studies by Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985), Copeland and Galai (1983), Treynor (1981) and Bagehot 
(1971) hypothesize a positive relation between the informed traders’ abnormal 
profits and the bid-ask spread in that security. Profitable trading by informed 
traders imposes abnormal losses on all opposing traders, including the 
market-maker. Consequently, the market-maker is forced to charge a higher 
‘See Fama (1970) for a review of theory and early evidence on the efficient markets hypothesis. 
H. N. Seyhun, Insider lruding and market efficiency 191 
bid-ask spread to all traders to help offset his systematic losses to informed 
traders. In this study, the significance of the uninformed traders’ expected 
losses to the informed traders is investigated by examining the relation between 
the bid-ask spread and insiders’ abnormal profits. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relation between 
profitable trading by informed traders and the bid-ask spread. The insider 
trading data and the sample characteristics are discussed in section 3. Section 4 
explains the empirical methodology, and section 5 presents the results. Conclu- 
sions and implications are in section 6. 
2. Informed traders’ abnormal profits and bid-ask spread 
If some traders are better informed than others, then the market-maker in a 
security experiences an adverse selection problem. If he were to set a single 
price to buy and sell any amount of securities on demand, on average, he 
would neither gain from nor lose to uninformed investors, since trading by 
uninformed investors is not related to abnormal future stock price movements 
by definition. However, he would systematically lose to the informed traders. 
He would inadvertently buy stock from the informed traders prior to abnormal 
stock price declines and sell stock to the informed traders prior to abnormal 
stock price increases, thereby resulting in inventory positions that are nega- 
tively correlated with future abnormal stock price movements. In effect, the 
informed traders’ abnormal profits would come at the market-maker’s expense. 
If the market-maker cannot distinguish the informed traders from the 
uninformed traders prior to trading, then he would be forced to charge all 
traders for the expected value of their possible non-public information. He 
would lower his bid (purchase) price to reflect possible unfavorable informa- 
tion and raise his ask (sale) price to reflect possible favorable information of 
the informed traders. The informed traders would still purchase stock from the 
market-maker if they expect the stock price to rise above the ask price, or sell 
stock to the market-maker if they expect the stock price to fall below the bid 
price. Therefore, even with a positive bid-ask spread, the market-maker 
continues to incur net losses to the informed traders. However, his losses to the 
informed traders are now offset by his gains from the uninformed traders, who 
now pay a higher bid-ask spread to trade with the market-maker. A higher 
bid-ask spread means that the expected traders’ abnormal profits come at the 
expense of the uninformed traders who trade for reasons other than profiting 
from information. 
The market-maker’s response to informed traders implies a positive relation 
between the bid-ask spread and the informed traders’ abnormal profits. The 
bid-ask spread would be higher than otherwise, if the informed traders possess 
more valuable information when they trade or account for a greater proportion 
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of the overall trading volume. 3 In effect, the market-maker’s bid-ask spread 
reflects his expected losses to all informed traders. 
Ignoring the relation between the bid-ask spread and the expected loss to 
informed traders can lead to an overstatement of the realizable return to any 
active trading rule. If it is assumed that investors can always trade at the 
current stock price without ever paying the bid-ask spread, then their realiz- 
able return will be overstated by an amount equal to their expected loss to 
informed traders. This study provides the first empirical test of the hypothe- 
sized positive relation between the bid-ask spread and the expected loss to 
informed traders. If the evidence indicates a significant positive relation 
between the bid-ask spread and the expected loss to informed traders, then an 
allowance for the expected loss to informed traders can be made by including 
the bid-ask spread for a loo-share transaction as an additional cost of trading. 
The bid-ask spread for a loo-share transaction would overestimate the ex- 
pected loss to informed traders to the extent that it reflects other costs of 
market-making. However, if the informed investors trade larger volumes of 
stock to exploit more valuable information, then the bid-ask spread for a 
loo-share transaction can also underestimate the expected loss to informed 
traders from their larger volume transactions. 
3. Data and sample characteristics 
The insider trading data used in this study come from a computer tape 
compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The tape sum- 
marizes more than 1.5 million insider transactions in all publicly held firms 
from 1975 to 1981. This study analyzes a sample of transactions in 790 firms 
on the daily returns file of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
The 190 firms listed on option exchanges on January 1, 1977 are included in 
the sample. The remaining 600 firms are chosen by stratified random sampling 
based on the size of firms’ equity. Out of 790 firms, 21 did not report any 
insider trading between 1975 and 1981. Consequently, the actual number of 
firms analyzed is 769. 
Table 1, panel A shows a breakdown of tbn insider trading sample by firm 
size. The sample analyzed in this study contains a total of 59,148 open market 
sales and purchases.4 Total dollar value of insiders’ transactions exceeds $11 
billion, 58% of which occurs in the largest firm size group. Panel B shows a 
3 Other factors that can affect the size of the bid-ask spread, such as the competition facing the 
market-maker or costs of maintaining inventories, are analyzed in Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972), 
Tinic and West (1972). Benston and Hagerman (1974) Stall (1978), and Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) among others. 
4Numerous consistency checks on dates, prices, and shares were performed to eliminate 
approximately 1000 transactions containing apparent data errors. Also, transactions involving less 
than 100 shares are excluded. 
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Distribution of the number of firms, dollar value, and number of transactions, grouped by the 
average size of equity of the firm and the identity of insiders (dollar figures are in $ million). 
Sample period is from 1975 to 1981. 
Less 
than $25 
million 
Number 
of firms 
Total dollar 
value of 
transactions 
Number of 
transactions 
Ratio of 
purchases 
to sales 
104 
$152 
4,141 
2.09 
Panel A : Grouping by Jirm size 
Between 
Between Between $250 
$25 and $50 and million 
$50 $250 and 
million million $1 billion 
68 173 267 
$182 $1,287 $2,990 
3,010 10,552 23,267 
1.27 0.79 0.57 
Officers 
Panel B: Grouping by identity of insiders 
Chairmen 
OWcer- of boards of 
Directors directors directors 
- 
- 
More 
than $1 
billion 
157 
$6,490 
18,178 
0.59 
Large 
share- 
holders 
All 
firms 
169 
$11,101 
59,148 
0.70 
All 
insiders 
Total dollar 
value of 
transactions 
Number of 
transactions 
$806 $1,889 $571 $408 $7,427 $11,101 
21,913 17,486 6,520 3,400 9,829 59.148 
breakdown of the insider trading sample by the identity of insiders: officers, 
directors, officer-directors, chairmen of the boards of directors, and large 
shareholders. Officers trade most frequently, followed by directors, large 
shareholders, officer-directors, and chairmen of the boards of directors. The 
large shareholder group also trades the largest dollar volume of stock, account- 
ing for 67% of the overall dollar volume of trading. 
4. Empirical methodology 
4.1. Benchmark selection 
Among the recent insider trading studies, Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976) 
use variants of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate abnormal 
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returns to securities. Work by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) shows that 
the CAPM based residuals are on average positive for small firms, and negative 
for large firms. This systematic bias in CAPM residuals can lead to biases in 
estimating abnormal returns in insider trading studies. If insiders have pre- 
dominantly more purchases than sales in small firms, then the positive CAPM 
residuals in small firms will be associated with insider purchases. Similarly, if 
insiders have predominantly more sales than purchases in large firms, then the 
negative CAPM residuals in large firms will be associated with insider sales. 
Table 1 shows the ratio of insiders’ stock purchases to sales for different size 
firms. In small firms, insiders have approximately twice as many purchases as 
sales. In large firms, the ratio of insiders’ purchases to sales falls to about 0.6. 
This evidence suggests that even if insider trading conveys no information, 
biases in the CAPM can indeed result in finding positive abnormal returns 
following insider purchases and negative abnormal returns following insider 
sales. Consequently, the conclusions of the previous insider trading studies 
using the CAPM benchmark may overstate the abnormal returns realized from 
insider trading. 
This study uses the market-model to measure the expected returns to 
securities. The market-model is a statistical model based on the joint normality 
of the distribution of security returns. Given parameter stationarity, the 
market-model prediction errors have an expected value of zero for firms of any 
size, thereby avoiding the bias introduced by CAPM. 
4.2. Abnormal returns and signijicance tests 
Based on the market-model, the prediction error PE,,, for security i on day 
t, from 199 days before to 300 days after each event day is calculated as 
follows: 5 
PJ% = (r,,r - (&,+pirnl,,))W for t= -199,300, (I) 
where r, f is the with-dividend return to security i on day t, and r,,,,, is the 
with-dividend return to value-weighted portfolio of all New York Stock 
Exchange and American Stock Exchange stocks on day t. To account for 
potential changes in market parameters, two sets of parameters 8, and /?, are 
estimated using ordinary least squares regression of r;,, on r,,t with 250 
pre-event and 250 post-event daily return data, always excluding the period 
from 199 days before to 300 days after the event day. The pre-event estimates 
are used to calculate the prediction errors between days - 199 and - 1, and 
post-event estimates are used to calculate the prediction errors between days 0 
and 300. The last insider trading day in each month is taken as the event day. 
The parameter W is equal to one if the number of buyers exceed the number 
5See Fama (1976, ch. 4) for a discussion of the market-model. The event study methodology is 
pioneered by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). 
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of sellers in that month, or minus one if the number of sellers exceed the 
number of buyers. If the number of buyers equals the number of sellers, that 
month is excluded. An insider is considered a buyer if he buys more shares 
than he sells or a seller if he sells more shares than he buys. Insiders who buy 
as many shares as they sell are ignored. 
Successive, non-overlapping one-month and two-month periods are used to 
classify insiders’ transactions. The overall results are similar and only two- 
month period results are reported. The two-month period results are chosen for 
extensive analysis to economize on data processing costs. 
The average portfolio prediction error for event day t, APE,, is calculated 
by averaging all prediction errors for that event day. This test statistic 
incorporates any possible cross-sectional dependencies of prediction errors at a 
given calendar day, 
APE, =; .z PE,., for t = - 199,300, (2) 
I r-l 
where K, is the number of prediction errors on event day t. 
The significance of the average portfolio prediction errors is measured by 
standardizing the average portfolio prediction errors by their sample standard 
error &(APE), 
t(APE,) =APE,/S(APE). (3) 
The sample standard error of APE,, S(APE), is calculated from 199 days 
before to 300 days after the event day, by taking into account the serial 
correlation of the APE,‘s. Empirical examination of the APE series shows a 
stationary, third-order autoregressive process. Thus, 
APE, = S + &APE,_, + &APE,_, + &APE,_, + u,. (4) 
The standard error of the APE series, &(APE), is computed by solving the 
Yule-Walker equations corresponding to eq. (4).6 The t-statistic in eq. (3) has 
a Student-t distribution with 493 degrees of freedom when APE, is a sta- 
tionary normal process. The cumulative daily average prediction error from 
event day t, to event day t,, CAPE(t,, t2), is calculated by summing the daily 
average prediction errors, 
CAPE (tl, tz) = t APE,. (5) 
I = I, 
The significance of the cumulative daily average prediction error is measured 
6For a discussion of autoregressive processes, see Nelson (1973). For the overall sample, the 
partial autocorrelation coefficients of the APE, in eq. (4) are 0.38 (t-statistic 8.4) at first lag, 0.16 
(t-statistic 3.5) at second lag, and 0.10 (r-statistic 2.2) at third lag. 
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by standardizing each cumulative daily average prediction error by its sample 
standard error,7 
t(CAPE(t,, t*)) = CAPE(t,, t,)/6(CAPE(t,, f,)). 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. ProJitability of insider trading 
The cumulative daily average prediction errors are plotted separately for 
sales and purchases in fig. 1. The cumulative daily average prediction errors 
and their t-statistics computed from eq. (5) and (6), respectively, are shown in 
table 2. For the overall sample, the prediction errors for sales are multiplied by 
minus one before averaging with purchases. Consequently, abnormal stock 
price rises following insiders’ purchases and abnormal stock price declines 
following insiders’ sales are measured as positive abnormal returns in the 
overall sample. 
If insiders purchase stock prior to an announcement of favorable informa- 
tion, then insiders’ purchases will be followed by positive abnormal returns. If 
insiders also refrain from purchasing stock until after unfavorable information 
is announced, then insiders’ purchases will be preceded by negative abnormal 
returns. Similar considerations hold for insiders’ sale transactions. Table 2 
shows that, during the 100 days following the insider trading day, stock prices 
rise abnormally by 3.0% (t-statistic 4.4) for purchases and decline abnormally 
by 1.7% (t-statistic -2.7) for sales. This suggests that insiders purchase stock 
prior to the release of favorable information and sell stock prior to the release 
of unfavorable information.8 During the 100 days prior to the insider trading 
day, stock prices decline abnormally by 1.4% (t-statistic - 2.1) for purchases 
and rise abnormally by 2.5% (t-statistic 4.0) for sales. This suggests that 
insiders also tend to refrain from purchasing stock until after unfavorable 
information is released, and from selling stock until after favorable informa- 
tion is released. Fig. 1 indicates that most of the abnormal stock price 
adjustment occurs during the 100 days following the insider trading day. For 
the overall sample, the stock price adjustment between days 101 and 300 is 
0.8% (t-statistic 0.9), which is insignificantly different from zero. 
‘The standard error of the cumulative daily average prediction error, G(CAPE(f,, t2)), is 
calculated from the general formula for the variance of a sum, 
a(CAPE(t,,r*)) = 5 5 COV(.4PE,,APEk) , 
[ ,=t, k=r, I 
l/2 
where the covariances of the APE are computed from the Yule-Walker equations corresponding 
to eq. (4). 
“During the first 40 days following the insider trading day, stock prices rise abnormally for 55% 
of the purchases and only 45% of the sales. The f-statistics for the hypothesis that the true 
proportions are 50% are 7.5 for purchases and - 9.4 for sales. 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative daily average prediction errors from 199 days before to 300 days after the 
insider trading day, for a portfolio of 769 firms traded by insiders during 1975 to 1981, separated 
by sale and purchase transactions, 
Insiders’ abnormal profits do not appear to be especially large. However, 
insider trading is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
Insiders can be sued for violating their fiduciary responsibilities to their 
shareholders if they trade on material non-public information prior to the 
public announcement of the information. 9 Consequently, insiders would not be 
expected to trade for their own account immediately prior to highly profitable 
but also publicized corporate events such as mergers and tender offers. 
Estimates of insiders’ abnormal profits presented in table 2 are smaller than 
the estimates in the previous insider trading studies. For example, Jaffe (1974) 
estimates insiders’ gross abnormal profits to be 2% over two months and 5% 
‘Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits fraud in purchase or sale of 
securities. Section 16(a) requires the reporting of insiders’ transactions. Section 16(b) requires the 
profits from purchases and safes within six months of each other to be returned to the corporation. 
Section 16(c) prohibits short sales by insiders. Section 32 as amended in 1975 provides penalties up 
to $10,000 fine and five years of imprisonment for violating any provision of the securities law. 
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Table 2 
Percentage cumulative daily average prediction errors, CAPE, and their t-statistics in parentheses, 
for 769 firms traded by insiders from 1975 to 1981 for selected periods around the insider trading 
day, denoted as day 0. 
Event period 
CAPE for 
overall 
sample 
CAPE 
for 
purchases 
CAPE 
for 
sales 
Day -100 
through 0 
Day -20 
through 0 
Day 1 
through 20 
Day 1 
through 50 
Day 1 
through 100 
Day 101 
through 300 
Day 1 
through 300 
Sample size 
- 2.1 
(-3.3) 
- 1.3 
(- 4.8) 
1.0 
(3.7) 
1.6 
(3.6) 
2.3 
(3.7) 
0.8 
(0.9) 
3.1 
(2.8) 
15,083 
- 1.4 
(- 2.1) 
-0.7 
( - 2.4) 
1.1 
(3.8) 
1.9 
(4.0) 
3.0 
(4.4) 
1.3 
(1.4) 
4.3 
(3.7) 
6,244 
2.5 
(4.0) 
1.7 
(6.2) 
-0.9 
(-3.3) 
- 1.5 
(- 3.4) 
-1.7 
(- 2.7) 
-0.5 
(-0.6) 
-2.2 
( - 2.0) 
8,839 
over eight months following intensive trading periods. An outsider who im- 
itates insiders with a two-month delay also earns 5% over the next eight 
months. This implies that Jaffe finds 7% abnormal returns over a ten-month 
period. Finnerty (1976) finds between 4.8% and 8.3% abnormal returns over an 
eleven-month period. Pratt and DeVere (1970) examine the returns to firms 
purchased by three or more insiders and sold by none, and firms sold by three 
or more insiders and purchased by none. Pratt and DeVere find that firms 
purchased outperform firms sold by 17.5% after one year, 28.6% after two 
years, and 32.4% after three years. 
In an attempt to reconcile the differences with the previous studies, the tests 
in table 2 are replicated using different models of expected returns, different 
estimating periods, and different classification criterion for insiders. As alterna- 
tive benchmark models, the Scholes and Williams (1977) estimates of the 
market-model parameters, the mean-returns adjusted model, and the 
Shave-Lintner version of the CAPM are used. The results based on 
the Scholes-Williams model and the mean-returns adjusted model agree 
closely with the market-model which suggests that the results are not sensitive 
to a particular measure of expected returns. The results using only the 
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pre-event periods to estimate expected returns to securities are similar to fig. 1. 
Using dollar volume of insider sales and purchases instead of number of 
insiders to classify a given month as a purchase or sale month also gives similar 
results. Classifying insider trading months on the basis of the net number of 
insiders (calculated as the absolute value of purchasers minus sellers in each 
month) does not reveal significant differences in abnormal returns to insiders. 
In contrast, using the CAPM benchmark to measure the expected returns to 
securities increases the measured abnormal returns during the 300 days follow- 
ing the insider trading day from 3.1% to 4.3%. This evidence is consistent with 
the upward bias in CAPM based abnormal returns. The exact magnitude of the 
bias due to CAPM during other time periods would depend on the strength of 
the small firm effect and the distribution of the sale and purchase transactions 
across firms. Also, using the period immediately prior to the insider trading 
day to estimate the market-model parameters increases the measured abnormal 
returns from 3.1% up to about 7%. This is not surprising since fig. 1 indicates 
that using the period immediately prior to the insider trading day would cause 
estimates of expected returns to be downward biased for purchases and 
upward biased for sales. These tests suggest that the failure of the CAPM to 
properly measure expected returns, as well as inappropriate choice of estima- 
tion periods, can result in larger estimates of abnormal profits following insider 
transactions. 
5.2. Bid-ask spread and expected loss to insiders 
As discussed earlier, the market-maker’s response to profitable trading by 
informed traders is to raise the bid-ask spread. Recent studies by Schultz 
(1983) and Stoll and Whaley (1983) show that there is a negative monotonic 
relation between firm size and the bid-ask spread. For small firms (average 
equity value of $3.4 million), Schultz estimates the bid-ask spread plus the 
commission fee to be 11.4%. Stoll and Whaley estimate that the bid-ask spread 
falls from 2.9% to 0.7% as firm size increases from about $15 million to more 
than $3 billion. Consequently, the hypothesized positive relation between the 
bid-ask spread and expected loss to insiders implies a negative relation 
between the firm size and expected loss to insiders. Fixed costs of market-mak- 
ing combined with lower trading volume in small firms also implies larger 
bid-ask spreads in small firms. However, if the fixed cost of market-making is 
largely responsible for differences in bid-ask spreads across firms, then no 
relation between firm size and expected loss to informed traders would be 
expected. 
The relation between the firm size and expected losses to insiders is investi- 
gated by using regression analysis. Including insider transactions from succes- 
sive calendar months induces autocorrelation of the residuals which is taken 
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Table 3 
Generalized least squares regression of the cumulative daily average prediction errors, and 
ordinary least squares regression of the probability of trading against insiders, on the average size 
of the equity of the firm.a The r-statistics for the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. 
Sample period is from 1975 to 1981. 
Model 
number Model 
Sample F- 
size statistics 
(1) CAPE(1,50) =0.130-0.0057LV 15,083 54.0b 
(8.3) (- 7.4) 
(2) CAPE(1,50) =0.045-0.015V2-0.023V3-0.035V4-0.036V5 15,083 15.5b 
(9.1) (-2.0) (-4.0) (-6.6) (-6.6) 
(3) CAPE(l,lOO) =0.200-0.0092LV 15,083 53.0b 
(8.1) (-7.3) 
(4) CAPE(l,lOO) =0.070-0.021V2-0.041V3-0.056V4-0.058V5 15,083 15.5b 
(7.2) (-1.7) (-4.4) (-6.7) (-6.6) 
(5) Probability=0.122-0.0054LV 
(6.0) (- 5.2) 
769 26.5b 
(6) Probability =0.036+0.0095V2-0.017V3-0.025V4-0.028V5 
(6.5) (1.0) (-2.5) (-4.0) (-4.0) 
769 9.0b 
‘CAPE(1,50) and CAPE(l,lOO) are the cumulative daily average prediction errors from 1 day to 
50 days, and 1 day to 100 days following the insider trading day, respectively. LV is the natural 
log of the average value of equity between 1975 and 1981. V2 = 1 if value of equity is greater than 
or equal to $25 million and less than $50 million, otherwise V2 = 0. V3 = 1 if value of equity is 
greater than or equal to $50 million and less than $250 million, otherwise V3 = 0. V4 = 1 if value 
of equity is greater than or equal to $250 million and less than $1 billion, otherwise V4 = 0. V5 = 1 
if value of equity is greater than or equal to $1 billion, otherwise V5 = 0. Value of equity is less 
than $25 million, if V2 = V3 = V4 = V5 = 0. Probability is probability of trading against insiders, 
calculated as the absolute value of the net dollar value of insider trading divided by the total dollar 
value of trading in that security from 1975 to 1981. 
bSignificant at 1% level. 
into account by using generalized least squares. The prediction errors across 
firms at a given calendar day are expected to be uncorrelated, since multiplying 
the prediction errors for sale transactions by minus one randomizes the 
prediction errors.” 
Table 3 shows regression of insiders’ abnormal profits on firm size. Models 
(1) and (3) indicate negative relations between the abnormal returns to insiders 
and the natural log of the firm size, both significant at the 1% level. Using the 
dummy variable models (2) and (4), insiders’ abnormal profits in different size 
firms are readily observable. The cumulative daily average prediction errors 
from 1 day to 50 days following the insider trading day decrease from 4.5% to 
0.9% as firm size increases from less than $25 million to more than $1 billion. 
Similarly, the cumulative daily average prediction errors from 1 day to 100 
“‘In addition to the market model, regressions are replicated using the mean-returns adjusted 
model, Scholes-Williams model, and CAPM. The results are similar and are not shown. 
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days following the insider trading day decrease from 7.0% to 1.2% as firm size 
increases from less than $25 million to more than $1 billion. This evidence 
suggests that, conditional on trading, insiders in small firms earn substantially 
greater abnormal returns than the insiders in large firms. Consequently, 
conditional on trading, insiders in small firms also impose substantially greater 
costs on the uninformed traders than the insiders in large firms. 
Table 3 also provides information on the probability of trading against 
insiders, defined as the ratio of dollar volume of insider trading to all trading 
in that security. Model (5) in table 3 shows a negative relation between the 
probability of trading against insiders and the log of firm size. This relation is 
significant at the 1% level. The dummy variable model (6) indicates that the 
probability of trading against an insider declines from about 4% for firms less 
than $25 million to about 0.8% for firms greater than $1 billion. Thus, the 
evidence indicates that the probability of trading against insiders also declines 
with increasing firm size. 
The results in table 3 indicate that the expected losses to insiders fall with 
the size of the firm. Insiders’ abnormal profits, conditional on trading, as well 
as the probability of trading against insiders decline with the size of the firm. 
To the extent insider trading is positively correlated with trading by all 
informed traders, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that informed 
traders impose significant costs on uninformed traders, and the bid-ask spread 
reflects the expected loss to informed traders. 
A precise imputation of the expected loss to informed traders requires 
measurement of the expected abnormal profits of all informed traders, an 
empirically infeasible task. This study takes the bid-ask spread for a loo-share 
transaction as an approximate measure of the expected loss to informed 
traders. With competition, the bid-ask spread would not differ from the 
expected loss to informed traders by more than other costs of market-making. 
For example, if the bid-ask spread were less than the expected loss to 
informed traders, then the market-maker could not survive. If the bid-ask 
spread were to exceed the expected loss to informed traders by more than the 
other costs of market-making, then other potential market-makers would find 
it profitable to undercut the market-maker by placing simultaneous buy orders 
at his bid price and sell orders at his ask price. 
Market efficiency studies generally assume that informed traders are a 
negligibly small part of the market, and therefore, the expected loss to 
informed traders may be ignored. The evidence presented in this study shows a 
significant positive relation between the bid-ask spread and the expected loss 
to insiders. This evidence suggests that the expected loss to informed traders is 
significant and is incorporated into the prices of securities. This finding implies 
that the expected loss to informed traders must also be taken into account to 
evaluate the realizable abnormal returns to active trading strategies. An 
approximate allowance for the expected loss to informed traders can be made 
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by including the bid-ask spread as an additional cost of trading. Such an 
example is Phillips and Smith (1980) who evaluate the efficiency of the listed 
options market by including the bid-ask spread as an additional cost of 
trading for active trading strategies. 
5.3. Determinants of insiders’ abnormal profits 
Previous insider trading studies have not investigated the sources of insiders’ 
superior predictive ability. Most studies examine intensive trading months, 
defined as the difference between number of buyers and sellers. Jaffe (1974) 
also examines large dollar volume of trading by insiders, but concludes that the 
dollar volume of trading by insiders is not related to the value of insider 
information. An exception is found by Scholes (1972) who reports differences 
in the quality of information for different secondary sellers. 
The tests presented in tables 4 and 5 investigate the determinants of insiders’ 
superior predictive ability. This investigation also provides a check on the 
robustness of the negative relation between the expected loss to insiders and 
firm size. Generalized least squares regressions are used to account for serial 
correlation of the residuals. The dependent variable is the estimate of insiders’ 
abnormal profit, the cumulative daily average prediction error. The indepen- 
dent variables are dummy variables for sales transactions and types of insiders, 
dollar volume of insider trading, proportion of firm traded, net number of 
insiders trading, and value of the firm. 
Model (1) in table 4 shows a regression of the cumulative daily average 
prediction errors from 1 day to 50 days after the insider trading day on a 
dummy variable for sales transactions. The regression confirms the earlier 
result that insiders can reliably forecast future abnormal stock price changes, 
and purchase stock prior to abnormal price increases and sell stock prior to 
abnormal price decreases. Model (2) shows a regression of cumulative daily 
average prediction errors on types of insiders. All insiders are grouped into one 
of five categories: officers, directors, officer-directors, chairmen of the board of 
directors, and large shareholders. A given month is classified as an officer 
trading month, if officers trade the most dollar volume during that month.” 
The coefficient of the officer-director group is significantly positive at the 1% 
level, suggesting that on average officer-directors trade on more valuable 
information than officers. Differences between all insiders are significant at the 
5% level. These tests indicate that insiders who are more familiar with the 
overall operations of the firm trade on more valuable information. 
Model (3) shows a regression of the cumulative daily average prediction 
errors from 1 day to 50 days after the insider trading day, on the dollar value 
“Similar results are obtained by classifying insider trading months on the basis of the frequency 
rather than the dollar value of insiders’ transactions. 
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of trading. The slope coefficient in model (3) is insignificantly different from 
zero, which suggests that the dollar value of insider trading is not related to the 
value of insider information. This finding is similar to Jaffe (1974) and Scholes 
(1972) who also fail to find a relation between dollar volume of trading and 
value of insider information. A likely explanation for this result can be found 
in tables 1, 3, 4, and 5. Table 1 indicates that insiders in large firms and large 
shareholders in all firms account for most of the dollar value of trading. Table 
3 and model (2) of tables 4 and 5 suggest that insiders in large firms and large 
shareholders in all firms trade on less valuable information. Consequently, the 
lack of information content of the large dollar volume transactions is likely to 
be due to the fact that the large dollar volume of transactions proxies for large 
firms and large shareholders: Insiders in large firms and large shareholders in 
all firms who happen to trade the large dollar volume transactions, also trade 
on less valuable information. 
Model (4) in table 4 uses the natural log of the dollar value of trade. Taking 
the log of the dollar value of trade puts relatively less weight on extremely 
large dollar value transactions. The regression indicates that insiders’ abnormal 
profits increase with the log of the dollar value of the transactions. The 
coefficient of the log of dollar value of trading is significantly positive at 
slightly above the 1% level. Model (5) uses the natural log of the proportion of 
the firm traded. Model (5) also indicates a positive relation between the 
insiders’ abnormal profit and the log of proportion of the firm traded which is 
significant at the 1% level. Models (4) and (5) suggest that insiders trade larger 
dollar volume of stock to exploit more valuable information. However, dollar 
volume of trading increases less than linearly with the value of insider 
information. 
Model (6) uses the natural log of the dollar value of trading and the natural 
log of firm size as explanatory variables. The coefficient of the dollar value of 
trading remains significantly positive, while the coefficient of firm size remains 
significantly negative. In fact, including firm size increases the significance of 
the dollar value of trading: For a given firm, insiders respond to more valuable 
information by trading a greater dollar volume of stock. Model (7) uses the 
natural log of the proportion of the firm traded and log of firm size. Once 
again, the proportion of the firm traded is positively related to insiders’ 
abnormal profits, while firm size is negatively related to insiders’ abnormal 
profits. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
Types of insiders are included as additional explanatory variables in models 
(8) and (9). Inclusion of the types of insiders does not diminish the explanatory 
power of the firm size or the dollar value of insider trading. The magnitude and 
the significance of the estimated coefficients for firm size and dollar value of 
trade agree closely across models (6) and (8). Similarly, the magnitude and the 
significance of the estimated coefficients for firm size and the proportion of the 
firm traded agree closely across models (7) and (9). This evidence suggests that 
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the types of insiders, dollar volume of trading, and firm size are separate 
determinants of insiders’ abnormal profits. 
Model (10) shows a regression of insiders’ abnormal profits on the net 
number of insiders, defined as the absolute value of the difference between the 
number of buyers and sellers. The magnitude of insiders’ abnormal profits 
generally increases with the net number of insiders, and the differences among 
abnormal returns to the net number of insiders are significant at the 5% level. 
This result is similar to a finding by Jaffe (1974). Model (11) also includes the 
natural log of the proportion of the firm traded as an additional explanatory 
variable. Both the coefficient and the significance of the proportion of the firm 
traded remain unchanged from model (5). However, in model (11) the net 
number of insiders variable is no longer significant. This evidence suggests that 
the significance of the net number of insiders is due largely to a proxy effect for 
the proportion of the firm traded. 
The regressions in table 5 use the cumulative average prediction errors from 
1 day to 100 days following the insider trading day as a measure of insiders’ 
abnormal profits. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in table 5 are 
somewhat higher than in table 4 while the significance levels of the estimated 
coefficients are comparable. Differences between table 4 and table 5 are most 
notable for the identity of insider regression. Model (2) suggests that the 
chairmen of the boards of directors as well as the officer-directors trade on 
more valuable information than officers. Differences in abnormal returns to all 
insiders are significant at the 1% level in model (2). The other regressions 
indicate that sales versus purchases, dollar volume of trading, proportion of the 
firm traded, and firm size remain as significant determinants of insiders’ 
predictive ability. Once again, the significance of the net number of insiders is 
due largely to a proxy effect for the proportion of the firm traded. 
The evidence presented in tables 4 and 5 suggests several conclusions. First, 
it appears that insider information arises as a result of insiders’ association 
with the firm, since insiders who are closer to day-to-day decision-making trade 
on more valuable information. Second, the significant negative relation be- 
tween insiders’ abnormal profits and firm size is not diminished when other 
determinants of insider trading are considered. Most profitable insider trading 
occurs in small firms. Third, insiders can distinguish the differences in the 
value of their information and trade a larger volume of stock when they have 
more valuable information. The failure of the previous insider trading studies 
to find a positive relation between dollar volume of trading and value of 
insider information appears to be due to the fact that the large dollar volume 
of transactions proxies for large firms and large shareholders. 
The evidence presented in tables 4 and 5 also provides additional support 
for the hypothesis that the bid-ask spread reflects the expected loss to 
informed traders. If the ‘fixed costs of market-making are mostly responsible 
for determining the bid-ask spreads, then the bid-ask spread is expected to 
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Table 6 
Insiders’ open market transactions from 1975 to 1981, grouped by the number of calendar days 
between the insider trading day, the day insiders’ reports are first received by the SEC and the 
availability day of the Oficial Summary. Numbers in parentheses are the fraction of the total 
sample of 59,148 transactions. 
Event period 
Delay less than 
or equal to 30 
days 
Delay between 
30 and 60 
days 
Delay between 
60 and 90 
days 
Delay over 
90 
days 
Trade day to 
report day 
Report day to 
availability of 
OJicial Summay 
Trade day to 
availability of 
OfJiclul Summary 
38,791 15,616 1,507 3,174 
(0.66) (0.27) (0.03) (0.05) 
1,389 38,246 18,560 953 
(0.02) (0.65) (0.31) (0.02) 
134 9,487 31,272 18,255 
(0.0) (0.16) (0.53) (0.31) 
fall with the dollar volume of trade, since a given cost is averaged over a 
greater number of shares. If the expected loss to informed traders is a 
significant factor in determining the bid-ask spread, then the bid-ask spread is 
expected to rise with the dollar volume of trade, since tables 4 and 5 indicate 
that market-maker’s expected loss to informed traders rises with the dollar 
volume of trade. The available evidence shows that the bid-ask spread indeed 
rises with the dollar volume of trade.12 
A word of caution is in order at this point. The coefficients of determination 
of the regressions shown in tables 4 and 5 are about 1%. This indicates that 
characteristics of the reported insider transactions explain a small proportion 
of the variance of abnormal returns. One interpretation of the small coefficient 
of determination is that insider trading regulations deter insiders from trading 
freely on the basis of their privileged information. Insiders would have 
incentive to refrain from trading, or hide their most important information 
transactions by trading through friends and relatives to avoid potential sanc- 
tions by the SEC. Non-reported trading by insiders or trading by informed 
traders who are not classified as insiders are likely to be more sensitive to the 
value of their information. 
5.4. Market efficiency 
This study also examines the availability of abnormal profits to outsiders 
following the first day insiders’ reports are received by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the day the OJicial Summary becomes publicly 
“For example, Mikkelson and Partch (1985) report that the underwriting spread increases with 
the relative size of the secondary offerings. 
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Table 7 
Percentage cumulative daily average prediction errors and their r-statistics in parentheses for 769 
firms traded by insiders from 1975 to 1981 around the day insiders’ reports are first received by the 
SEC and the day the Oficial Summary is available. 
Event period 
Day 1 
through 20 
Day 1 
through 50 
Day 1 
through 100 
Day 1 
through 300 
Sample size 
Cumulative daily average prediction errors 
Insiders’ reports are OfJial Summary is 
received by SEC; available on 
day 0 is last day of month day 0 
0.5 0.3 
(3.2) (1.9) 
0.8 0.7 
(3.5) (2.4) 
1.4 1.2 
(4.3) (3.0) 
1.9 1.1 
(3.4) (1.7) 
10,221 8,302 
available.13 Table 6 shows that there are substantial delays in reporting and 
publishing insiders’ transactions. For example, the delay between the insider 
trading day and the availability day of the Oficial Summary exceeds 90 days 
for 31% of the transactions and 60 days for 84% of the transactions. To prevent 
biasing the tests against market efficiency, only the reported transactions as of 
the last day of each month are used to form portfolios. Similarly, for the 
publication day tests, only the published transactions in the Ojicial Summary 
are used to form portfolios for any calendar month. 
Table 7 shows the cumulative daily average prediction errors for selected 
periods around the day insider reports are received by the SEC and the 
availability day of the Oficial Summary. The cumulative daily average predict- 
ion errors are also plotted in fig. 2. The methodology used to measure the 
magnitude and significance of the cumulative daily average prediction errors is 
identical to the trading day tests. Table 7 indicates that if an outsider trades on 
the basis of insiders’ transactions as soon as insiders’ reports are received by 
the SEC, he can earn 1.4% after 100 days and 119% after 300 days. If the 
outsider waits until after the Oficial Summary is available, then the gross 
abnormal return is only 1.1% during the next 300 days, Fig. 2 indicates that the 
decline in abnormal return following the dissemination of insider trading 
13Since no publication dates appear on the Oficial Summary, the date the O@cia/ Summaty is 
received by the Rush-Rhees Library of the University of Rochester is used as the availability date. 
Due to delays in postal delivery, the actual availability date may be as much as a week to ten days 
earlier than the delivery date to the Rush-Rhees Library. 
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Fig. 2. Cumulative daily average prediction errors from 199 days before to 300 days after the first 
day insiders’ reports are received by the SEC and the availability day of the Oficial Summa? to a 
portfolio of 769 firms traded by insiders during 1975 to 1981. 
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information is attributable to the stock price adjustment following the insider 
trading day. 
To evaluate the realizable abnormal profits from imitating insiders, out- 
siders’ gross abnormal profits are compared to the bid-ask spread for loo-shares 
plus the commission fee for a round trip transaction. The bid-ask spread plus 
the commission fee is taken to be 6.8% for firms less than $25 million, 5.2% for 
firms between $25 and $50 million, 3.7% for firms between $50 and $250 
million, 3.2% for firms between $250 million and $1 billion, and 2.7% for firms 
greater than $1 billion. l4 Net of these trading costs, abnormal returns to 
outsiders following either the reporting day or the publication day are non- 
positive. In addition, abnormal profits to outsiders using more selective trading 
rules based on identity of insiders, dollar volume of trading, proportion of the 
firm traded, and firm size are examined. More selective trading rules also reveal 
no significantly positive abnormal profits to outsiders net of the trading costs. 
This evidence is consistent with market efficiency. Insiders can predict future 
abnormal stock price changes, however, following the public dissemination of 
insider trading information, outsiders cannot earn abnormal profits net of 
trading costs. 
6. Conclusions and implications 
The evidence presented in this study indicates that insiders can predict 
abnormal future stock price changes. Insiders purchase stock prior to an 
abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stock prior to an abnormal decline in 
stock prices. Furthermore, different insiders possess differences in quality of 
information. Insiders who are expected to be more knowledgeable with the 
overall affairs of the firm, such as chairmen of the boards of directors or 
officer-directors, are more successful predictors of future abnormal stock price 
changes than officers or shareholders alone. Evidence also suggests that in- 
siders can discern the differences in the value of their information and trade 
greater volumes of stock to exploit more valuable information. 
The evidence presented in this study also shows that as a percentage of stock 
price, the expected loss to insiders and firm size are negatively correlated. This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the expected loss to informed 
traders is reflected in the bid-ask spread for a given security, since smaller 
firms have larger percentage bid-ask spreads. An implication of this evidence 
is that ignoring the expected loss to informed traders, especially in small firms, 
can lead to an overstatement of the realizable abnormal return to any active 
trading strategy. An allowance for the expected loss to informed traders can be 
“‘Estimates of trading costs correspond to Stall and Whaley estimates for their firm size groups 
1, 2, 6, 9, and 10. See Stall and Whaley (1983. p, 73). 
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made by deducting the bid-ask spread from the gross abnormal return to any 
active trading strategy. This evidence also suggests that some recent anomalies 
concerning the efficient markets hypothesis can disappear if the expected loss 
to informed traders is taken into account by including the bid-ask spread as 
an additional cost of trading. 
In this study, the realizable return to outsiders is examined following the 
first day insiders’ reports are received by the SEC and the day the OfJicial 
Summary becomes publicly available. Following the public dissemination of 
insider trading information, the abnormal return to outsiders net of the 
bid-ask spread plus the commission fee is non-positive. Examining more 
selective trading rules based on types of ‘insiders, dollar volume of trading, 
proportion of the firm traded, and firm size also shows that no significantly 
positive abnormal return to outsiders net of the trading costs. This evidence is 
consistent with market efficiency: Outside investors cannot use the publicly 
available information about insiders’ transactions to earn abnormal profits. 
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